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COMMENT
NLRB AND PRIVATE ARBITRATION: SHOULD
COLLYER BE EXTENDED TO EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE CASES?
ALBEON G. ANDERSON, JR.*
In a recent decision, Collyer Insulated Wire,' the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) announced a major policy de-
termination concerning the respective responsibilities of private arbitra-
tion procedures and the NLRB's own enforcement procedures when,
in certain situations, those procedures can be brought. to bear upon the
same subject matter. Significantly, the Board elected to emphasize the
role of private arbitration by requiring the parties to utilize their agreed-
upon grievance-arbitration procedures in the first instance and by re-
taining only the limited responsibility of reviewing those proceedings
to assure that they have been "fair and regular" and have not produced
a result which is "repugnant to the Act." The Board has thus recognized
that private settlements should be encouraged 2
 and has demonstrated
a strong commitment to the "processes of voluntarism"s which have
produced a system of industrial jurisprudence through which most labor
disputes can be resolved by the parties themselves.'
As significant as the Collyer decision is, it only partially solves the
problem of unnecessary NLRB interference in disputes which readily
lend themselves to private settlement. The facts in ,Collyer limit its
holding to situations in which an employer's unilateral action is alleged
to violate Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Acts and
where the employer defends on the ground that he was not required to
bargain over the action because it was specifically permitted by his
labor agreements This is not, however, the only area where the
* B.A., 1964, Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D., 1967, Northwestern University School
of Law; Member, Illinois Bar.
1
 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 (1971).
2 Section 203(d) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "Final adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. 1 173(d) (1970).
See generally, "A Case Story" Remarks by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller
at the Conference of Western States Employer Association Executives, 167 D.L.R. D-1
(1971).
4 See generally, 30 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 1-2 (1966).
5 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970) (hereinafter referred to as NLRA). Section 8(a) (5)
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
6
 The General Counsel of the NLRB has directed Regional Offices of the Board to
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authority of a private arbitrator and, the NLRB may overlap. There
exists a large class of employee discipline cases which present an analo-
gous problem. This article will discuss the interaction of the statutory
and contractual standards applicable to these discipline cases and will
ascertain whether, in that area, the "processes of voluntarism" em-
braced by Collyer will produce results consistent with the applicable
national labor policy.
I. NLRB DEFERENCE TO GRIEVANCE AND
ARBITRATION—A HISTORY
Where a collective bargaining relationship has been established and
a labor agreement negotiated, it is quite possible for a labor dispute to
be based on an alleged violation of both the existing labor agreement
and the NLRA. Since disputes involving these two substantive areas
are resolved in separate forums—private grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures' in the case of alleged contract violations, and the National
Labor Relations Board8
 in the case of alleged NLRA violations—this
substantive overlap naturally leads to competing jurisdictional claims
on behalf of the two enforcement procedures.
As collective bargaining relationships developed and matured under
the Act, the potential conflict arising out of this concurrent jurisdiction
became apparent and required resolution. In dealing with this problem,
the NLRB evolved, over a considerable period of time, a seemingly
neutral policy of dealing with each case on the basis of that case's
particular posture vis-à-vis the grievance-arbitration procedure. That
limit application of the Collyer policy to the facts of Collyer. Memorandum; Arbitration
Deferral Policy under Collyer, Peter G. Nash, General Counsel of NLRB (Feb. 28, 1912).
For a brief description of the Nash Memorandum, see Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, supra at 1380.
A typical collective bargaining agreement usually includes a grievance procedure
through which the parties presumably intend to resolve disputes concerning the administra-
tion of their agreement. Although these procedures vary, they generally provide for
progressively higher steps of union-management meetings. These steps correspond
roughly to the union and company hierarchies. Typically, the first step will involve a
meeting between the employee and his immediate supervisor. If the dispute is not re-
solved at that step, the employee usually may appeal his case to a higher level of
management—either a department head or the plant superintendent, depending upon
the number of steps provided in the contract. If the dispute remains unresolved after
these meetings, the case may be appealed to the final step prior to arbitration. In large
corporations this step would involve a representative from the company's headquarters
staff and a representative from the international union. Thus, it is hoped that solution of
all but the most compelling issues will be accomplished by the parties themselves. For those
few issues which cannot be resolved by them, the typical contract provides for final and
binding arbitration. See generally, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor,
Bull. No. 1425-1, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grievance Procedures (1964)
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1425-6, Major Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration Procedures (1966).
8 Section 10 of the NLRA confers jurisdiction upon the NLRB to process unfair
labor practice complaints alleging violations of Section 8 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. { 160 (1970).
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is, the Board would defer to existing arbitration awards provided they
met certain minimum standards. On the other hand, where the parties
had not submitted their dispute to arbitration the Board would pro-
ceed to decide the merits of the case without requiring the parties to
exhaust their contractual remedies.
The Board's long-standing policy of deferring to existing arbitra-
tion awards was most clearly articulated in Spielberg Manufacturing
Co 9--an employee discipline case. There, the Board stated:
[T]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all
parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitra-
tion panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act. In these circumstances we believe that the desir-
able objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes will best be served by our recognition of the arbitra-
tors' award. 1°
Thus, recognizing the benefits of voluntary solutions and acknowledging
that national labor policy can be effectuated by these private settlements,
the Board will hold the parties to settlements in which they themselves
have participated."
Unfortunately, prior to Collyer, the Board's enthusiasm for exist-
ing arbitration awards did not carry over to cases which could have
been—but were not—decided by a neutral. Where no award had been
rendered, the Board made no distinction between cases which were
pending before an arbitrator" and those which were dropped or
never processed." It was equally disposed to intervene in each type of
situation. As this particular policy developed, certain problems which
0
 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). Spielberg was recently reaffirmed
in an employee discipline case. National Tea Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 80 L.R.R.M.
1736 (1972).
10 Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
11
 In two recent cases, Air Reduction Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 79 L.R.R.M.' 1467
(1972) and Yourga Trucking, Inc. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972), four
members of the Board have indicated that, in employee discipline cases, the party seeking
to have the Board defer to an arbitration award must adduce proof that the issue of
asserted discriminatory motive was "presented to the arbitral forum which considered
whether the discipline of an employee was imposed for just cause." Yourga Trucking,
Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499. This issue is discussed at some length in Anderson, Concurrent
Jurisdiction—NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 179, 190-92 (1970). There it is concluded that:
There is no reason to believe that the parties and their arbitrators will not see
the real issues in a particular case, nor is there any reason to believe that they
will not explore all of the facts .. . . The remote possibility of arbitral non-
involvement is simply not a persuasive argument against deference.
12 Eastern Illinois Gas & Securities Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969).
10 Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 466, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968).
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militated against its application became apparent." In addition, this
policy produced the anomalous result of acknowledging on one hand
that the national labor policy can be effectuated by private settlements,
but on the other hand, not actively promoting the use of these private
forums in the first instance.
This inconsistency was apparently recognized in Gayer where,
at least as far as unilateral action cases are concerned, the Board
reversed its prior policy. In Collyer the employer had unilaterally
initiated changes in an existing incentive plan, increased the wage rate
for certain skilled occupations and modified maintenance assignments."
Although the company had sought the union's agreement to these
changes during contract negotiations, it nevertheless believed these
changes to be permissible under the provisions of the existing labor
agreement. The union disagreed, but instead of initiating a grievance,
it filed an unfair labor practice charge, claiming a violation of Section
8(a) (5) of the Act. Responding to this charge, the employer maintained
that the disputes should be resolved in the grievance and arbitration
procedure established in their labor agreement.
Addressing itself to that specific issue, the NLRB reviewed the
history of the Board's reaction to overlapping jurisdiction and concluded
that it would be "consistent with the fundamental objectives of Federal
law to require the parties . . . to honor their contractual obligations
rather than, by casting [the] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their
agreed-upon procedures."" In reaching this conclusion, the Board ob-
served that its policy would, in most cases, satisfactorily resolve the
underlying dispute and would thus eliminate the necessity of the parties
utilizing the costly and time-consuming NLRB procedures. Further,
it made clear that, by reserving jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
reviewing the fairness of the arbitration proceeding, it had effectively
safeguarded the statutory rights of the parties."
Having reversed its prior policy by requiring the parties to exhaust
their contractual remedies prior to invoking NLRB procedures, the
Board proceeded to define the limits of its new policy. Quoting approv-
ingly from the Joseph Schlitz decision," the Board stated:
14
 Since, in deciding Collyer, the Board apparently recognized this fact, the specific
problems associated with failing to defer are not discussed in the text of this article.
For a thorough discussion of these problems, see Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction
—NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 179, 188-90 (1970).
15
 Since this article is addressed to the future application of CoRyer, the facts of
the case are not discussed in great length. For a more thorough discussion of the facts, see
Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, supra at 1376-81.
10
 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937-38 (1971).
17 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
10 Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1968).
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[W]here, as here, the contract clearly provides for grievance
and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral action taken
is not designed to undermine the Union and is not patently
erroneous but rather is based on a substantial claim of con-
tractual privilege, and it appears that the arbitral interpreta-
tion of the contract will resolve both the unfair labor practice
issue and the contract interpretation issue in a manner compat-
ible with the purposes of the Act, then the Board should defer
to the arbitration clause conceived by the parties."
However, as a condition precedent to applying this test, the Board
held, as it had in Schlitz, that "the circumstances of [the] case" must
be such that resort to arbitration would not be futile." Board Member
Brown, in his concurring opinion, explained this requirement by stat-
ing that the Board should not defer to arbitration
where there has been a repudiation of the collective-bargaining
process. In such a situation the desirability of encouraging
resort to arbitration must yield to the Board's duty to protect
the bargaining process. Deferral, of course, would not en-
courage bargaining where the very process of bargaining, in-
cluding grievance arbitration, has been repudiated and is, in
effect, nonexistent?'
It is important to note, however, that a breakdown in the system can-
not be inferred from the mere fact that one of the parties has elected
to ignore his agreed-upon forum and has instead invoked the jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB. The Board's affirmative holdings on the state of the
parties' relationship in both Schlitz and Collyer clearly demonstrate
that the charging party's selection of the Board's procedures may be
motivated by reasons other than the collapse of the bargaining relation-
ship.
Before determining whether the Collyer test—applied in the above
context—lends itself to employee discipline cases, it is necessary to
la 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 (1971).
20 Specifically, the Board in Callyer stated:
The circumstances of this case, no less than those in Schills, weigh heavily
in favor of deferral. Here, as in Schiils, this dispute arises within the confines
of a long and productive collective-bargaining relationship. The parties before us
have, for 35 years, mutually and voluntarily resolved the conflicts which inhere
in collective bargaining. Here, as there, no claim is made of enmity by Respondent
to employees' exercise of protected rights. Respondent here has credibly asserted
its willingness to resort to arbitration under a clause providing for arbitration
in a very broad range of disputes and unquestionably broad enough to embrace
this dispute.
Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1935.
21 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1940 (1971).
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review the status of employee discipline under collective bargaining
agreements and under Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
II, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE UNDER SECTION 8(a) (3) OF THE
ACT AND UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEDLENTS
Under the terms of the NLRA, the National Labor Relations
Board has been granted jurisdiction over a limited area of employee
discipline. Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act provides that
Mt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization . . . . 22
Naturally, it is quite possible for such discrimination to take the form
of disciplinary retaliation against an employee's union activities. In
such a situation, the discipline is subject to NLRB review.
On the other hand, review of a far broader area of employee disci-
pline is normally granted to the parties' arbitrator by the terms of their
collective bargaining agreement. The issue of unrestricted authority
in the area of employee discipline has spawned many organizing cam-
paigns and is inevitably a high priority subject at the bargaining table
following a successful campaign." It is therefore not surprising that
most modern labor agreements provide some limitation on management's
right to discipline its employees." In the few instances where no express
limitation exists, some arbitrators have implied a "just cause" standard,
reasoning that a company's unrestricted right to terminate the employ-
ment relationship could be used to negate all substantive provisions of
the labor agreement." Consequently, in the vast majority of contractual
22 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (3) (1970).
23 S. Slichter, J. Healy and E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management 624 (1960).
Even where there was little evidence of ... irresponsible behavior on the part of
management, the union seeking to organize employees often impressed upon
employees the protection offered by collective bargaining against unfair disci-
plinary treatment. It is a mistake to feel that a union's contribution is limited
to periodic contract improvements; it has a great influence on disciplinary
policies and actions. This is felt on almost a daily basis during the life of an
agreement, either because of the silent presence of the union or because the
union has been quick to prosecute grievances relating to allegedly unfair discipline.
Id.
24 In a recent study of 1,697 major collective bargaining agreements in which a
grievance procedure exists, no contracts were found to exclude discharge cases. Out of
1,609 contracts which provided for arbitration, only 34 contracts limited the scope of
the arbitrator's authority in the area of discipline. Of that number, only four excluded
all disciplinary matters. The 30 remaining contracts excluded specific issues such as the
degree of discipline and discipline given to probationary employees. See U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bulls. No. 1425-I, 1425-6, supra note 7.
23 See F. Elkouri and E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 410-13 (1960).
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relationships management's right to discipline has been restricted either
by the express terms of the contract or by implication to those situations
where "just cause" exists.
Whether the results achieved by this broad, voluntarily-accepted
standard are consistent with the purposes of the Act—and thus warrant
Board deference to the private forum in the first instance—will be
determined in the analysis that follows.
III. STATUTORY COMPATIBILITY OF SOLUTIONS
ARRIVED AT IN THE PRIVATE FORUM
Two general arguments are frequently advanced in support of the
proposition that—in employee discipline cases—the private forum
will not produce results which are consistent with the purposes of the
Act. The first deals with the procedural due process afforded employees
in private arbitration proceedings. The second concerns the scope of
private arbitration proceedings in that it is claimed that resolution of
the contractual "just cause" issue will not necessarily dispose of the
statutory issue.
A. Procedural Due Process and Private Arbitration
In support of the position that the NLRB should not defer to
private grievance-arbitration procedures, it has been asserted that,
in discipline cases, it is possible that an employee will not receive a
fair hearing in the private system. This indictment of private arbitration
is based either on a general apprehension over the arbitral system or on
the specific premise that, in certain situations, there may be no real
conflict between the company and the union. For instance, both the
union and the company may consider an employee to be particularly
obnoxious and may be happy to see him go. 2° Similarly, the lack of
conflict may come about by reason of the employee's union politics.
That is, a member of a dissident political faction may feel concerned
about the vigor with which his personal grievance is being processed
by members of the incumbent opposition.'
This "interest identity" between the company and the union,
coupled with the fact that arbitrators are selected by and thus beholden
to these parties, leads, we are told, to the conclusion that private
arbitration suffers from an institutional bias against the employee and in
favor of the union-company establishment. This bias is reported by
26 See generally, Local 485, IUE (Automative Plating), 170 N.L.R.B. 1234, 67
L.R.R.M. 1609 (1968), modified, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 74 L.R.R.M. 1396, enf. in pertinent
part, 454 F.2d 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 2278 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1972).
27 See generally, Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 396, 53 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1963).
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some to be prevalent and severe enough to justify a policy of non-
deference in the area of employee discipline."
These allegations are serious anc4annot be lightly dismissed. How-
ever, upon close examination, the number of incidents involving pro-
cedural irregularities in general appears to be few. As noted earlier,
the NLRB—as part of its review function under Spielberg—verifies
the procedural integrity of disputed arbitration awards.2° Commenting
on its overall experience in reviewing these cases, the Board stated in
Collyer:
It is true, manifestly, that we cannot judge the regularity or
statutory acceptablity of the result in an arbitration proceed-
ing which has not occurred. However, we are unwilling to
adopt the presumption that such a proceeding will be invalid
under Spielberg and to exercise our decisional authority at this
juncture on the basis of a mere possibility that such a proceed-
ing might be unacceptable under Spielberg standards. That
risk is far better accommodated, we believe, by the result
reached here of retaining jurisdiction against an event which
years of experience with labor 'arbitration have now made
clear is a remote hazard."
Thus, the concern about procedural irregularity in private arbitration
appears to be overstated. Certainly, this problem is not so prevalent
as to warrant a complete rejection of the private forum.
Indeed, even if abuses were more prevalent, a blanket disavowal
of private arbitration procedures would not be the appropriate remedy.
Instead, the fundamental problem which permits such occurrences—
unfair representation by an employee representative—should be dealt
with directly and resolved on its own merits.
Employees are provided a number of independent remedies for
violations of their right to be fairly represented. First, the courts, since
1944, have imposed a duty on a labor organization to fairly and im-
partially represent all of its members." Similarly, the NLRB, in 1962,
held that
28
 Atleson, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 355 (1971);
Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale L.J. 1191 (1968).
29 See p. 1462 supra.
so 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R,R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971) (emphasis added).
81 In 1944, the Supreme Court construed the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. H
151 et seq. (1970), as imposing "upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as
exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Con-
stitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
whom it legislates." Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
This duty was subsequently imposed upon bargaining agents who are certified under the
National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255
(1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
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Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act . . . prohibits labor organiza-
tions, when acting in a statutory representative capacity,
from taking action against an employee upon considerations
or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious or unfair."
Thus, in addition to private court action, each employee possesses a
right, enforceable by the NLRB, to be fairly represented by his union.
Since the establishment of this fair representation cause of action, the
Board has effectively dealt with this problem and has been able to
fashion remedies where necessary." Therefore, since the rights of
individual employees can be protected directly, the remote possibility
that a labor organization will abuse its statutory privilege in no way
justifies a blanket disavowal of private arbitration.
B. Will the Arbitration Proceedings Resolve the
Unfair Labor Practice Issue?
The second argument frequently advanced against deferring to
private arbitration in discipline cases concerns the alleged functional
dissimilarity of the two forums. Proponents of this position believe that
the contractual standard of "just cause" may not produce a result which
is compatible with the national labor policy as expressed in Section
8(a) (3) of the Act, because " 'just cause' might exist even though the
true reason for the firing was union activity, which insofar as it is
protected by the Act, cannot be limited by contract.' The issue then
is whether, in the area of employee discipline, there is a sufficiently
strong possibility that results achieved in the private forum will be
at odds with the statutory standard so as to overcome the positive value
found to exist in requiring the parties to utilize that forum. The answer
to this question depends in part on the particular disciplinary issue
presented.
Employee discipline cases can be generally grouped into two
categories. As will become apparent, different considerations apply to
these two groups of cases. First, the employee may claim that the plant
rule under which he was disciplined is in and of itself violative of the
Act. Secondly, he may assert that his discharge—although phrased as
a violation of a valid company rule—was actually motivated by his
union activities.
32
 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). The Miranda Fuel doctrine was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Local
12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1966). The Supreme
Court has left the question open. Vaca v: Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192-93 (1967).
aa See Port Drum Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 590, 73 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1970) ; Local 485, IUE,
supra note 26. In both cases the respective unions refused to process grievances on be-
half of the affected employees.
84 See Member Jenkins' dissent in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1950 n.47.
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Cases in the first category are typified by disputes over "no solicita-
tion" or "no union insignia" rules. Here, the issue concerns the right
of an employer to make such a rule—not whether it was broken." This
question is exclusively one of national labor policy. Therefore, except
insofar as an arbitrator's decision on a factual question may tend to
make the unfair labor practice question moot, the Board's exercise of
its jurisdiction in this area is not improper." However, legitimate
concerns in this limited area should not be allowed to cloud the issues
in the distinguishable "mixed motive" discipline cases.
These "mixed motive" cases come to the Board on a claim that
the alleged plant rule violation is merely a pretext upon which the
employer acted. It is claimed that, in reality, the employee was dis-
charged because of his union activities. Unlike the invalid rule situation
described above, the dispositive issue here is factual—not statutory.
The point at issue is the employer's subjective intent in discharging the
employee. As will became apparent, the Board applies many techniques
common to private arbitration in deciding that issue.
An arbitrator's decision on the "just cause" issue normally includes
a determination of whether the disciplined employee is being treated
on the same basis as other employees. Clearly, this is also the overriding
consideration in NLRB "mixed motive" cases because, unless section
8(a) (3) grants disciplinary immunity to employees—an effect which it
clearly does not have—an employee who claims to have been dis-
criminated against on the basis of his union activities, must by
85
 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 16 L.R.R.M. 620
(1945); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
a8
 See generally, Anderson, supra note 14 at 194-95.
87
 Section 10(c) of the Act provides, in part, that:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1970).
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 10(c) as follows: "The legislative history
of that provision indicates that it was designed to preclude the Board from reinstating
an individual who had been discharged because of misconduct." Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2614 (1964). The Court further
noted that:
The House Report states that the provision was "intended to put an end to
the belief, now widely held and certainly justified by the Board's decisions, that
engaging in union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the
plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in incivilities and other
disorders and misconduct." H.R. .Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42
(1947). The Conference Report notes that under § 10(c) "employees who are
discharged or suspended for interfering with other employees at work, whether
or not in order to transact union business, or for engaging in activities, whether
or not union activities, contrary to shop rules, or for Communist activities,
or for other cause [interfering with war production] . . . will not be entitled
to reinstatement." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1947).
Id. at 217 n. 11, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609.
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implication believe that other less vocal proponents of the union would
not have been disciplined under the same circumstances. Hence, an
examination of the Board's treatment of "mixed motive" cases reveals
factual determinations similar to those made by an arbitrator dealing
with "just cause." In finding discriminatory motivation, the Board has
relied on such factors as: 1) the employee, and employees generally,
had no knowledge of the rule;" 2) the employee was not told specifi-
cally why he was being disciplined; a° 3) the rule was discriminatorily
applied in that it was seldom enforced or was normally not applied
in so severe a fashion; 4° 4) the employee had never been warned in
what would be considered a continuing infraction, for example, in-
efficiency; 41 5) a minor infraction resulting in severe discipline; 42 and
6) a waiver by the company of its disciplinary authority by reason of
prior condonation of the particular employee's conduct. 4° Even a cur-
sory examination of these factors reveals that they are "the very stuff
of labor contract arbitration"' in general and of "just cause" in par-
ticular.
The similarity of approaches employed by private arbitrators and
the NLRB in the area of employee discipline militates against the argu-
ment that these two forums will arrive at incompatible results. Thus,
it would appear that, in the area of "mixed motivation," no significant
difference exists between the national labor policy and the parties'
own interests as expressed in their labor agreements. That is, application
of the collective bargaining standard of "just cause" will produce re-
sults that are consistent with the country's labor policy. Therefore,
a major consideration expressed in Collyer—that the arbitrator's de-
cision "... resolve both the unfair labor practice issue and the contract
interpretation issue in a manner compatible with the purposes of the
Act. . . ,"45—is satisfied in the largest group of employee discipline
cases. The possibility of inconsistent results is sufficiently remote so as
not to warrant a presumption against the private forum.
38 See, e.g., Lincoln Bearing Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1145, 60 L.R.R.M. 1502, 1503
(1965).
89 See, e.g., Hendrie & Bolthoff Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1196, 1199, 51 L.R.R.M. 1247,
1248 (1962).
40 See, e.g., Hawthorn Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 251, 258, 65 L.R.R.M. 1609, 1611 (1967).
41 Sec, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 658, 663, 48 L.R.R.M.
1721 (1961); Collins & Aikman Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 735, 742, 15 L.R.R.M. 826, 828,
enf., 146 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1944).
42 See, e.g., Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1399, 1407, 59 L.R.R.M. 1638, 1639 (1965).
49 Id.
44 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936-37 (1971).
45 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936; see generally, Miller, supra note 2 at D-3.
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CONCLUSION
In Spielberg, the leading case dealing with deference to existing
arbitration awards, the Board held that private settlements could ef-
fectively implement the national labor policy in the area of employee
discipline. In Collyer, the landmark case dealing with deference to an
unutilized grievance-arbitration procedure, the NLRB found that the
national policy could be served by requiring the parties to utilize their
agreed-upon dispute-settling procedures in the first instance. Although
Collyer was a unilateral action case, its rationale has been shown to
be equally applicable to "mixed motive" employee discipline cases. An
examination of objections to such an extension of Collyer proved them
to be more illusory than real. No factors have been shown which
warrant a presumption against private arbitration in the area of em-
ployee discipline.
By extending Collyer to employee discipline cases, the Board
would acknowledge the respective responsibilities incumbent upon each
forum. On the other hand, by continuing its present policy of interven-
tion in this area, the Board undermines the foundation of the private
forum. This was perhaps best expressed by Board Chairman Miller
when he stated:
I think that when parties have voluntarily agreed upon a
mechanism for the adjustment of their disputes, then to the
widest extent possible we ought to permit that machinery to
operate and not complicate the situation by permitting either
party to side-step those processes and instead look to govern-
ment in the form of this Board to decide the merits of their
disputes. . . .
If we make clear to the parties that we are not going to rescue
them from the imperfections of their own system, we will
encourage rather than discourage them in taking necessary
action to improve the processes Which they will now be obliged
to follow without our serving as an easily available alterna-
tive."
By directing the parties to their agreed-upon forum in the first instance,
the Board would promote industrial stability through the realization
that collective bargaining can be made to work only if the parties under-
stand that they must resolve their problems themselves.*
40 Miller, supra note 3 at D-4.
Since submission of this article, the NLRB has deferred to an arbitration proceeding
which was already underway in an employee discipline case. National Radio Co., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1118 (1972).
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